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Abstract

What dynamics shape public risk perceptions? What significance should public views have in the
formation of risk regulation? In Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (2005), Cass
Sunstein catalogs a variety of cognitive and social mechanisms that he argues inflate public estimations of various societal risks. To counter the impact of irrational public fears, he advocates
delegation of authority to politically insulated experts using economic cost-benefit analysis.
Missing from Sunstein’s impressive account, however, is any attention to the impact of cultural
cognition, the tendency of individuals to adopt risk perceptions that reflect and reinforce their
cultural worldviews. Relying on existing and original empirical research, we use this dynamic to
develop an alternative “cultural evaluator” model, which better explains individual variation in
risk perception, differences of opinions among experts, and the intensity of political conflict over
risk than does Sunstein’s “irrational weigher” model. Cultural cognition also complicates Sunstein’s policy prescriptions. Because the public fears that Sunstein describes as “irrational” express cultural values, expert cost-benefit analysis does not merely insulate the law from “factual
error,” as Sunstein argues; rather, it systematically detaches law from popular understandings of
the ideal society. Indeed, the best defense of Sunstein’s program might be just that: by eliding the
role that risk regulation plays in endorsing contested cultural visions, expert cost-benefit analysis
protects the law from a divisive and deeply illiberal form of expressive politics. The difficult task
for those who understand the phenomenon of cultural cognition and who favor democratic modes
of policymaking is to devise procedures that assure popularly responsive risk regulations both
rational and respectful of diverse cultural worldviews.
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Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation
of Sunstein on Risk
Dan M. Kahan,* Paul Slovic∗∗
Donald Braman,∗∗∗ and John Gastil****
To secure the public good . . . and at the same time to preserve the
spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object
to which our inquiries are directed.
— James Madison1

[T]he only thing we have to fear is fear itself . . . .
— Franklin D. Roosevelt2

The effective regulation of risk poses a singular challenge to
democracy. The public welfare of democratic societies depends on
their capacity to abate all manner of natural and man-made hazards — from environmental catastrophe and economic collapse to
domestic terrorism and the outbreak of disease. But the need to
form rational responses to these and other dangers also challenges
democratic societies in a more fundamental way: by threatening
*Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor of Law and Deputy Dean, Yale Law School.
∗∗Professor of Psychology, University of Oregon; President, Decision Re-

search.
∗∗∗Irving S. Ribicoff Fellow, Yale Law School.
****Associate Professor, University of Washington.
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1 Federalist No. 10, at 49 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 2003).
2 Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), in Richard
Polenberg, The Era of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1933–1945: A Brief History
with Documents 40 (2000).
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their commitment to genuinely deliberative policymaking. Effective
risk regulation depends on highly technical forms of scientific information — epidemiological, toxicological, economic, and the
like. Most citizens don’t even have access to such information,
much less the inclination and capacity to make sense of it. Why,
then, should regulatory law afford any weight to the uneducated
opinions of ordinary citizens as opposed to the reasoned judgments
of politically insulated risk experts?
It is the urgency of this question that makes the study of risk
perception a policy science of the first order. Employing a diverse
array of methods from the social sciences, the field of risk perception seeks to comprehend the diverse processes by which individuals form beliefs about the seriousness of various hazards and the
efficacy of measures designed to mitigate them. Risk perception
scholars are not of one mind about the prospects for making public
opinion conform to the best available scientific information on risk.
But no one who aspires to devise procedures that make democratic
policymaking compatible with such information can hope to succeed without availing herself of the insights this field has to offer.
Cass Sunstein’s Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle
is a major contribution to the field of risk perception written in precisely this spirit. In Sunstein’s view, the major thing proponents of
democratically grounded risk regulation have to fear, in essence, is
fear itself. Adroitly synthesizing a vast body of empirical literature,
Sunstein catalogs the numerous social and cognitive mechanisms
that drive members of the public to form wildly overstated estimates of various societal dangers. Sunstein identifies a number of
important institutional devices designed to shield “deliberative democracy” from the pernicious influence of these “risk panics” (p.
1). They include, principally, a form of expert cost-benefit analysis
that would separate out considered public values from irrational
public fears, and a set of administrative procedures that would
make law responsive to the former and impervious to the latter.
Few recent works in the field of risk perception rival Sunstein’s in
breadth, intelligence, and relevance.

Afraid of Democracy

3

But as masterful as Sunstein’s account is, its persuasiveness is
undercut by Sunstein’s inattention to one of the most important
recent advances in the science of risk perception. A growing body
of work suggests that cultural worldviews permeate all of the mechanisms through which individuals apprehend risk, including their
emotional appraisals of putatively dangerous activities, their comprehension and retention of empirical information, and their disposition to trust or distrust competing risk-information purveyors. As
a result, individuals effectively conform their beliefs about risk to
their visions of an ideal society. This phenomenon — which we
propose to call “cultural cognition” — not only helps to explain
why members of the public so often disagree with experts about
matters as diverse as global warming, gun control, the spread of
HIV through casual contact, and the health consequences of obtaining an abortion; it explains why experts themselves so often
disagree about these matters, and why political conflict over them
is so intense.
The phenomenon of cultural cognition underwrites a strong
critique of the analysis that Sunstein presents in Laws of Fear. Once
the influence of culture is taken into account, what Sunstein sees
as public hysteria is often revealed to be a complex form of status
competition between the adherents of competing cultural visions.
This reformulation of public risk sensibilities in turn undermines
much of Sunstein’s normative account of how the law should respond to public risk perceptions. Because citizens’ fears express
their cultural visions of how society should be organized, the line
between “considered values” and “irrational fears” often proves illusory. Reliance on expert cost-benefit analysis, in these circumstances, becomes less a strategy for rationally implementing public
values than a device for strategically avoiding political disputes
over individual virtue and collective justice.
Unfortunately, though, it’s not clear that incorporating cultural cognition into the science of risk perception reduces the complexity of reconciling rational risk regulation with democratic decisionmaking. A theory of risk perception that incorporates cultural
cognition is teeming with insights on how to structure risk commu-

Afraid of Democracy

4

nication; by linking risk perception to cultural values, it identifies
myriad new strategies for managing public impressions (particularly
affect-laden ones) of what risks are real and what risk-mitigation
strategies are effective. But at the same time such a theory makes
the prescriptive dimension of risk regulation more tractable, it
makes the normative dimension of it considerably harder to assess.
If risk disputes are really disputes over the good life, then the challenge that risk regulation poses for democracy is less how to reconcile public sensibilities with science than how to accommodate diverse visions of the good within a popular system of regulation. Fear
itself may indeed be what democratic societies, or at least pluralistic
ones, most have to fear — not because governmental responses to
risk are likely to be irrational, but rather because risk regulation is
inherently fraught with the potential for illiberality.
We will develop this response to Sunstein’s Laws of Fear in
four Parts. In Part I, we will explicate Sunstein’s account. Sunstein’s theory is best understood within the context of a debate
over two competing models of risk perception — one that sees individuals as rational weighers of risk and another that sees them as
irrational weighers.
In Part II, we examine the dynamic that Sunstein’s account
overlooks: cultural cognition. We will show how cultural cognition
supports a distinct model of risk perception — one in which individuals behave neither as rational nor irrational weighers but rather
as cultural evaluators of risk. In Part III, we will show how this
model calls into question the central positive, normative, and prescriptive components of Sunstein’s account.
Finally, in Part IV, we will examine what the cultural evaluator model of risk reveals about the tension between risk regulation
and liberalism. Surprisingly, one response to this tension might be
to base public policymaking on an irrational-weigher theory such as
Sunstein’s, precisely because that model overlooks the cultural underpinnings of public risk perceptions.
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I. Sunstein and the “Irrational Weigher” Model
Advances in the field of risk perception have been fueled by an
energetic debate between the proponents of two opposing theories.
These theories, which we will call the “rational weigher” and “irrational weigher” models, posit competing accounts of the nature of
individual judgments of risk and how the law should respond to
them. Sunstein’s account is most readily understood within the
context of this debate. Thus, we begin with a general overview of
the points of contention between the rational-weigher and irrational-weigher models and then turn to the particulars of Sunstein’s sophisticated articulation of the latter.
A. Two Conceptions of Individual Risk Perception: Rational vs. Irrational Weighing
Grounded in the assumptions and methods of neoclassical
economics, the rational-weigher model asserts that individuals, in
aggregate and over time, form judgments toward risk that maximize
expected utility. Decisions to take a hazardous job (say, as a construction worker),3 to purchase a potentially dangerous consumer
good (perhaps a chainsaw),4 or even to engage in manifestly unhealthy forms of personal recreation (smoking cigarettes5 or unsafe
sex)6 — all ultimately embody a considered balancing of costs and
benefits.
To be sure, people suffer from imperfect information, make
mistakes, and even lack the capacity to follow through on what
they correctly perceive to be in their best interests. But as a result
of chance variation and market-based and related forms of social
3 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Risk by Choice: Regulating Health and
Safety in the Workplace 37 (1983).
4 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 Yale L.J. 353, 358 (1988).
5 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Smoking: Making the Risky Decision

(1992).
6 See, e.g., Thomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, Private Choices
and Public Health: The AIDS Epidemic in an Economic Perspective 57 – 83
(1993).
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selection, whatever departures from utility maximization these impairments might induce in particular individuals can be expected to
cancel each other out across individuals. Accordingly, even if no
individual approaches risk in a perfectly rational fashion, people
behave as if they were doing so in aggregate.7
The rational-weigher model counsels a generally restrained
role for governmental risk regulation. If people left to their own devices can be expected to make choices that maximize their wellbeing, then devising legal regimes and institutions to regulate risk
taking is largely unnecessary and indeed ultimately destructive of
societal wealth and individual freedom.8 The only circumstance in
which regulatory intervention is clearly warranted is when utilitymaximizing individuals can be expected to expose others to risks
the expected costs of which are not fully borne by those creating
them. But when imposing regulation to combat externalities of this
sort, regulators should not, according to proponents of the rationalweigher model, be guided by their own personal judgments of what
types of risk taking are socially desirable. Rather they should try to
base regulatory standards on the preferences implicit in the behavior of persons who do fully internalize both the costs and benefits of
putatively dangerous activities. In effect, regulatory responses to
risk should mimic the individual responses revealed in markets and
related forms of collective behavior.9
The irrational-weigher model, in contrast, posits that people,
considered individually or collectively, approach matters of risk in a
manner that systematically fails to maximize their utility. Drawing
on social psychology and behavioral economics, the proponents of
this position have cataloged a vast array of cognitive limitations
and defects that distort popular perceptions of risk.10 Thus, indi7 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 4, at 374–84; Viscusi, supra note 3, at 4.
8 See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 3, at 4; Schwartz, supra note 4, at 383.
9 See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 3, at 114–35.
10 See Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk 1–50 (2000) (cataloging various social psychological mechanisms that distort lay perceptions of risk); Roger
G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. Legal Stud. 747 (1990) (same).
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viduals are disposed to wildly overestimate the magnitude of highly
evocative risks (say, of a nuclear power accident) and to ignore less
evocative ones (say, of developing cancer from peanut butter).11
Far from canceling each other out, the types of risk-estimation errors that people are prone to make on an individual level tend to
become even more exaggerated as individuals interact with one
another. Various mechanisms of social influence cause popular risk
perceptions to reinforce and feed on themselves, generating waves
of mass incomprehension.12
The irrational-weigher model counsels a much more aggressive
program of governmental regulation. The cognitive defects and social forces that tend to distort risk perception have the biggest impact on members of the lay public; scientifically trained experts are
less vulnerable to these influences because they routinely access
and comprehend accurate sources of information, form more balanced mental inventories of the harms and benefits associated with
various putatively dangerous behaviors, and converge on consensus
judgments through rigorous exchanges with other, similarly well
informed observers.13 It thus makes sense to entrust matters of environmental regulation, consumer protection, workplace safety,
and the like to such experts, who should be insulated as much as
possible from politics to avoid the distorting influence of the public’s misapprehension of risk.14
We have sketched out the rational- and irrational-weigher
models in their purest forms. It’s possible, of course, to formulate

11 See, e.g., Roger E. Kasperson, Ortwin Renn, Paul Slovic, Halina S.
Brown, Jacque Emel, Robert Goble, Jeanne X. Kasperson & Samuel Ratick, The
Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework, 8 Risk Analysis 177, 178
(1988); see also Slovic, supra at note 10, at 37–38; Noll & Krier, supra note 10,
at 754 – 55.
12 See, e.g., Kasperson et al., supra note 11, at 179–86.
13 See Howard Margolis, Dealing with Risk: Why the Public and the
Experts Disagree on Environmental Issues 71 – 97 (1996).
14 For an influential statement of this view, see Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation (1993).
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intermediate positions that include elements of both.15 Even more
important, it’s possible to qualify either model based on considerations external to both. Some exponents of the irrational-weigher
model, for example, are careful to distinguish divergences between
lay and expert risk assessments that reflect the bounded rationality
of the public from those that reflect “rival rationalities”: one, on
the part of experts, that seeks to reduce all issues of risk to a unitary expected-utility metric; and another, on the part of the public,
that includes qualitative elements of appraisal that defy such a metric.16 But the pure forms of the rational- and irrational-weigher
models are both well represented in the study of risk perception
and furnish useful reference points for making sense of any particular scholar’s position.
B. Sunstein on Risk
Sunstein’s position, as reflected in Laws of Fear, embodies the
premises of the irrational-weigher model in an essentially unqualified form. Indeed, based on his systematic description of the dynamics that drive public risk perceptions and his detailed normative prescriptions for shielding risk regulation from the distorting
influence of these forces, Sunstein’s theory can be viewed as the
most instructive account of what the irrational-weigher model entails for law.
1. Descriptive. — Sunstein’s conception of the irrationalweigher model of risk contains two components. The first comprises the various psychological mechanisms that dispose individuals to systematically misestimate risk. The second highlights the

15 One might characterize Kip Viscusi’s more recent work, which treats
market and other private behavior toward risk taking as rational and political
responses as irrational, in this way. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Risk Policy (1998).
16 See Slovic, supra note 10, at 137–53, 285–315. For an innovative attempt to build qualitative evaluations of risk into a framework of cost-benefit
analysis that minimizes the distorting influence of various cognitive biases, see
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 941 (1999).
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social forces that magnify popular assessments of risk as individuals
interact with one another.
Among the former is the “availability heuristic.” This dynamic
refers to the tendency of individuals to “assess the magnitude of
risks” based on how “easily . . . [they can] think of . . . examples” of
the misfortunes to which these risks give rise (p. 36).17 Thus, nuclear power triggers alarm because of the notoriety surrounding the
accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl; the hazards of toxic
waste disposal assume massive proportions because of the publicity
that surrounded the Love Canal affair; arsenic levels in drinking
water generate apprehension because “arsenic is [a] well known
. . . poison,” in part due to the “classic movie about poisoning, Arsenic and Old Lace” (pp. 37–38). The influence of the availability
heuristic can easily distort public judgment, moreover, insofar as
calamitous misfortunes, however isolated, are much more likely to
grab media attention and stick in the public memory than are the
myriad instances in which risky technologies, chemicals, or processes generate benefits for society.18
Another mechanism that distorts public risk perceptions is
“probability neglect.” This is Sunstein’s term for characterizing an
asserted disposition of persons “to focus on the worst case, even if it
is highly improbable” (p. 35). To maximize expected utility, individuals ought to discount the gain or loss associated with a course
of action by the probability that such an outcome will occur.19 Experimental research shows, however, that individuals are less likely
to discount in this fashion when they are evaluating outcomes that
provoke strongly negative emotions such as fear; the cost individuals are willing to incur to avoid such outcomes is relatively insensitive to the diminishing probability that such outcomes will occur.20
For Sunstein, this finding implies that ordinary citizens are likely to
17 See Slovic, supra note 10, at 37–38.
18 Cf. Margolis, supra note 13, at 94–97.
19 See generally David Sklansky, The Theory of Poker 9–11 (1999).
20 See Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and
Electric Shocks: On the Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 Psychol. Sci. 185 (2001).
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support expensive measures, however remote the risks and however
cost-ineffective the abatement procedures. Examples, he argues,
include massive investments in toxic waste cleanup and cumbersome procedures for screening mail for anthrax (pp. 83–85).
Additional related mechanisms converge to make individuals
unduly insensitive to the benefits of risky technologies. One of
these mechanisms is “loss aversion.” Typically, “a loss from the
status quo is seen as more undesirable than a gain is seen as desirable” (p. 41).21 Another is the “endowment effect.” Individuals
value goods more once they have them than they did before they
acquired them;22 as a result, they are likely to resist courses of action that require them to risk goods they have to achieve states of
affairs they would value even more (p. 42). Individuals also display
a form of “status quo” bias23 (p. 42): in appraising a potentially
beneficial but also risky course of action, they fall back on the
maxim “[b]etter safe than sorry”24 (p. 47) to justify inaction.25 In
tandem, these dispositions generate a species of conservatism that
causes individuals to seize on the potential “losses produced by any
newly introduced risk, or by an aggravation of existing risks,” to
block new technologies without “concern[] [for] the benefits that
are forgone as a result” (p. 42) (emphasis omitted). This is the explanation, according to Sunstein, of “[w]hy . . . people [are] so
concerned about the risks of nuclear power” even though “experts
tend to believe that [nuclear power] risks are . . . lower, in fact,
than the [environmental] risks from competing energy sources,
such as coal-fired power plants . . .” (p. 47).

21 This is an application of Kahneman and Tversky’s famous “prospect
theory.” See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263, 263–91 (1979).
22 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler,
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. Econ.
Perspect. 193, 193–206 (1991).
23 See id.
24 Sunstein here quotes Margolis, supra note 13, at 5.
25 See id. at 74, 165–89.
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Another distorting mechanism is affect. The emotional responses that putatively dangerous activities trigger in persons have
been shown to be one of the most robust predictors of how risky
they perceive such activities to be.26 Indeed, Sunstein plausibly depicts the impact of affect as foundational to nearly all other
mechanisms of risk perception. The availability of risks is regulated
by how emotionally gripping the images of misfortune they provoke
are (pp. 38–39). It is “when intense emotions are engaged [that]
people tend to focus on the adverse outcome, not on its likelihood”
(p. 64). Persons react conservatively and display status-quo bias or
loss aversion because “[w]hen [they] anticipate a loss of what
[they] now have, [they] can become genuinely afraid, in a way that
greatly exceeds [their] feelings of pleasurable anticipation when
[they] look forward to some supplement to what [they] now have”
(p. 41).
The distorting influence that these psychological mechanisms
exert on individual risk perceptions is magnified, according to Sunstein, by two social forces. Sunstein calls the first of these “availability cascades” (p. 95). For the same reason that “fear-inducing
accounts” of misfortune with “high emotional valence” are likely to
be noticed and recalled, they are also likely “to be repeated, leading
to cascade effects, as the event becomes available to increasingly
large numbers of people” (p. 96). “[A] process of this sort,” Sunstein maintains, “played a large role in the [reaction to the] Washington area sniper attacks, the Love Canal scare, [and] the debate
over mad cow disease” (p. 94). Availability cascades also help explain “moral panics” in which large segments of society suddenly
come to perceive “religious dissidents, foreigners, immigrants, homosexuals, teenage gangs, and drug users” as sources of danger (p.
98).
26 See generally Paul Slovic, Melissa L. Finucane, Ellen Peters & Donald G.
MacGregor, Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect,
Reason, Risk, and Rationality, 24 Risk Analysis 311 (2004); Melissa L. Finucane,
Ali Alhakami, Paul Slovic & Stephen M. Johnson, The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13 J. Behav. Decision Making 1 (2000); George F.
Loewenstein, Elke U. Weber, Christopher K. Hsee & Ned Welch, Risk as Feelings, 127 Psychol. Bulletin 267–86 (2001).
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“Group polarization,” the second social force Sunstein discusses, magnifies the impact of individual biases when individuals
engage in deliberations over risks and how to abate them.27 Individuals don’t moderate their views when they engage in such discussions, Sunstein argues; on the contrary, “they typically end up
accepting a more extreme version of the views with which they began” (p. 98). If one view is even slightly predominant within a
group when it starts deliberation, arguments in favor of that position will predominate in discussions, fortifying the confidence of
those who hold that position and making a bigger impact on the
undecided. This effect will be reinforced by the subconscious desire
of persons to conform their view to the apparent majority, and by
the reluctance of those who perceive themselves to be in the minority to express a public stance that might expose them to ridicule.
Despite his emphasis on “[r]isk panics” (p. 1), Sunstein recognizes that the same dynamics that make “people . . . fearful when
they ought not to be” can also make them “fearless when they
should be frightened” (p. 1). Indeed, one state almost entails the
other. This is partially because so many risks are offsetting. A society that pays inordinate attention to the risks of nuclear power
necessarily pays too little to the risks associated with fossil fuels
(e.g., global warming and acid rain) (pp. 27–28). Many societies
that ban the pesticide DDT because they fear its carcinogenic effects are insufficiently mindful of the increased incidence of malaria
associated with using less effective substitutes (p. 32).
Excessive and insufficient fear also tend to mirror each other,
according to Sunstein, because of the largely hidden – and hence
emotionally tepid – financial impact of risk-reducing regulation.
Sunstein cites studies suggesting that every $7 million to $15 million in costs incurred to comply with governmental regulation is
itself associated with the expected loss of one human life because of
the adverse effect of such expenditures on the economy (pp. 32–
27 See generally Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently
Considered Evidence, 37 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 2098–2109 (1979).
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33). Accordingly, many costly programs that only slightly reduce
the magnitude of man-made or natural risks (such as the amount of
arsenic in drinking water) actually end up costing more lives than
they save (pp. 28–29).
It thus becomes impossible (practically and maybe even conceptually) to say which — excessive fear or excessive fearlessness
— dominates in public risk perceptions. But one conclusion that
can be drawn from Sunstein’s account is that the public, impelled
by emotion and waves of public hysteria to fixate on some risks and
wholly disregard others, can never be expected to get it right. The
greatest risk to the public’s health may be its own risk assessments.
2. Normative and Prescriptive. — Sunstein has just as much to
say about what the law should do to respond to distorted public
perceptions of risk as he does about the forces responsible for distorting them. Not surprisingly, he unequivocally rejects a “populist
system[]” (p. 1) of regulation that takes public risk evaluations at
face value. Indeed, one of the major objectives of Laws of Fear is to
critique the so-called “precautionary principle” as unduly responsive to public sentiments. That principle, which enjoys worldwide
support among environmentalists and regulatory authorities (pp.
15–18), asserts, essentially, that “when there is scientific uncertainty as to the nature of th[e] damage or the likelihood of the risk”
posed by some activity, “then decisions should be made so as to
prevent such activi[ty] . . . unless and until scientific evidence
shows that the damage will not occur” (p. 19) (internal quotation
marks omitted).28 When enforced by democratically responsive institutions, this approach, Sunstein maintains, yokes regulatory law
to the various mechanisms — availability, probability neglect,
status quo bias, and various forms of social influence — that make
the public irrationally fearful of “low-probability risks” (p. 26). At
the same time, because fixation on particular risks is always accompanied by inattention to offsetting risks and the adverse societal
impact of regulatory expenditures, the precautionary principle in28 Quoting Cloning: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Labor, Health and
Human Services of the S. Comm. On Appropriations, 108th Cong. (2002) (statement of Dr. Brent Blackwelder, President, Friends of the Earth).
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evitably forces society to forgo “technologies and strategies that
make human lives easier, more convenient, healthier, and longer”
(p. 25).
Unfortunately, Sunstein concludes, public irrationality of this
sort cannot be dispelled by education. The same mechanisms that
cause members of the public to form exaggerated perceptions of
risk will also prevent them from processing scientifically sound information in a rational way. Because “people neglect probability,”
for example, even accurate disclosure of risks may induce them to
“fix, or fixate, on the bad outcome,” thereby “greatly alarm[ing]
people . . . without giving them any useful information at all” (p.
123). Rather than emphasize how small a risk is, a better way to
dispel irrational fear, Sunstein argues, is to “[c]hange the subject,”
“discuss something else and . . . let time do the rest” (p. 125).
Ultimately, though, even this strategy of distraction is unlikely
to calm public anxieties, because scientists and enlightened regulators aren’t the only ones speaking (or not) to the public. “Terrorists[,] . . . environmentalists[,] and corporate executives,” among
others, can all be expected to strategically “exploit probability neglect” and related dynamics (p. 65). Propelled by “economic selfinterest,” news media, too, can be expected to intensify risk hysteria by reporting “[g]ripping instances” of misfortune, “whether or
not representative” of the activities that give rise to them (p. 103).
For Sunstein, there is only one credible treatment for the pathologies that afflict public risk assessment: the delegation of regulatory authority to independent expert agencies. “If the public demand for regulation is likely to be distorted by unjustified fear, a
major role should be given to more insulated officials who are in a
better position to judge whether risks are real” (p. 126).
Such experts, Sunstein maintains, are relatively immune from
the influences that inevitably distort public risk estimations. Drawing on social psychology’s “dual processing” model of cognition,
Sunstein contrasts two forms of information processing: “System I,”
which is “rapid, intuitive, and error prone” because pervaded by
“[h]euristic-based thinking” of the sort responsible for exaggerated
estimations of risk; and “System II,” which is “more deliberative,
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calculative, slower, and more likely to be error free” (p. 68).29 By
virtue of their training, the time they have to reflect, and their reliance on one another rather than misguided popular sources of information, scientific experts can be expected to use System II reasoning when appraising risks (pp. 85–87).
Investing politically independent experts with substantial authority, Sunstein insists, would not make risk assessment fundamentally undemocratic. “[W]ell-functioning governments,” he observes, “aspire to be deliberative democracies” (p. 1). They take account of the public’s anxieties, but their “responsiveness is complemented by a commitment to deliberation, in the form of reflection and reason giving” (p. 1). Accordingly, “if highly representative institutions, responding to public fear, are susceptible to error,
then it is entirely appropriate to create institutions that will have a
degree of insulation. Democratic governments should respond to
people’s values, not to their blunders” (p. 126).
The principal tool that expert regulators should use to distinguish public values from public misperceptions is cost-benefit analysis. Using this technique, regulators would assess the efficiency of
risk-abatement measures by comparing their own calculations of
the magnitude and probability of harm associated with risky technologies and substances to the value individuals (as revealed largely
through market behavior) attach to life and limb (pp. 131).30
29 For the classic statement of the “dual process” position, see Shelly
Chaiken, Heuristic Versus Systematic Information Processing and the Use of Source
Versus Message Cues in Persuasion, 39 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 752 (1980).
The “System I/System II” terminology comes from Daniel Kahneman & Shane
Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment,
in Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment 49, 51 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin and Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002).
30 Here Sunstein advocates an approach that is largely consistent with
that favored by rational-weigher theorists. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 15 at
126–28. The difference, presumably, is that Sunstein would favor regulation in
many contexts in which rational-weigher theorists are content to rely on markets. See id. (arguing that markets, when they internalize relevant costs, do better
at neutralizing various forms of individual irrationality than do government
agencies, which often magnify them).
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Although he acknowledges that this methodology is far from
perfect, Sunstein holds that cost-benefit analysis furnishes an indispensable tool for the rational regulation of risk in a democracy. Because it cleanses risk assessment of the contaminating influences of
availability, probability neglect, affect, and the like, “[i]t is an important way of disciplining public fear — of creating a kind of System II corrective against System I heuristics and biases” (p. 130).
Sunstein allows that cost-benefit analysis “provides [only] a
place to start” and “should not be taken as decisive” for the law (p.
174). On reflection, popularly accountable lawmakers might well
conclude that other values, including the welfare of poor people,
the protection of endangered species, or the preservation of pristine
areas, are worth the cost of enduring economically inefficient regulation (p. 129).
There is one particular type of popular veto, however, that
Sunstein’s conception of “deliberative democracy” can rarely if ever
abide: second-guessing of the magnitude experts assign to various
risks. Here, as elsewhere,31 Sunstein reacts with deep skepticism
toward the “rival rationality” hypothesis, which depicts many disagreements between expert and lay perceptions of risk as grounded
in differences of value, not knowledge. “Often experts are aware of
the facts and ordinary people are not” (p.86). “Hence a form of irrationality, not a different set of values, often helps explain the different risk judgments of experts and ordinary people” (p. 86). It is
precisely to root out public irrationality in perceptions of the “cost”
of risky technologies, in particular, that cost-benefit analysis by independent agencies is essential.
II. The Cultural Evaluator Model
Sunstein’s account rests on an admirably comprehensive synthesis of the empirical literature on risk perception. However, this
literature features an important dynamic to which Sunstein is strikingly inattentive: the impact of cultural worldviews. To set up our
assessment of how this omission detracts from Sunstein’s account,
31 Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1119, 1122–37
(2002) (reviewing Slovic, supra note 10).
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we begin with a summary of the recent work in this area, which, we
will argue, supports an alternative to both the rational-weigher and
irrational-weigher models of risk perception.
A. Cultural Cognition: Theory and Evidence
The claim behind cultural cognition is that culture is prior to
facts in societal disputes over risk. Normatively, culture might be
prior to facts in the sense that cultural values determine what significance individuals attach to the consequences of environmental
regulation, gun control, drug criminalization, and the like. But
more importantly, culture is cognitively prior to facts in the sense
that cultural values shape what individuals believe the consequences of such policies to be. Individuals selectively credit and
dismiss factual claims in a manner that supports their preferred vision of a good society.
The priority of culture to fact is the organizing premise of the
so-called “cultural theory of risk.”32 Associated most famously with
the work of anthropologist Mary Douglas and political scientist
Aaron Wildavsky,33 the cultural theory of risk links disputes over
environmental and technological risks to clusters of values that
form competing cultural worldviews — hierarchic, egalitarian, and
individualistic. Egalitarians, on this account, are naturally sensitive
to environmental hazards, the abatement of which justifies regulating commercial activities that are productive of social inequality.
Individualists, in contrast, predictably dismiss claims of environmental risk as specious, in line with their commitment to the
autonomy of markets and other private orderings. Hierarchists are
similarly skeptical, because they perceive warnings of imminent environmental catastrophe as threatening the competence of social
and governmental elites.

32 See generally Steve Rayner, Cultural Theory and Risk Analysis, in Social
Theories of Risk 83 (Sheldon Krimsky and Dominic Golding eds., 1992) (describing the theory and identifying key theoretical contributions to it).
33 See Mary Douglas & Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture (1982).
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Although one can imagine alternative explanations for cultural variation in risk perceptions,34 cultural cognition offers a distinctively psychometric one.35 On this view, the impact of cultural
worldviews is not an alternative to, but rather a vital component
of, the various psychological and social mechanisms that have been
shown to determine perceptions of risk. These mechanisms, cultural cognition asserts, are endogenous to culture. That is, the direction in which they point risk perceptions depends on individuals’
cultural values.
Consider the “affect heuristic.” Emotional responses to putatively dangerous activities strongly determine risk perceptions,36
but what determines whether those responses are positive or negative? The answer, cultural cognition asserts, is culture: persons’
worldviews infuse various activities — firearm possession,37 nuclear
power generation,38 red-meat consumption39 — with despised or
valued social meanings, which in turn determine whether individuals react with anxiety or calmness, dread or admiration, toward
those activities. This account recognizes, in line with the best psy-

34 Douglas and Wildavsky, for example, suggest a functionalist account in
which individuals are deemed to form beliefs congenial to their ways of life precisely because such beliefs promote those ways of life. See Mary Douglas, How
Institutions Think 31 – 43 (1986); Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis &
Aaron Wildavsky, Cultural Theory 104 – 07 (1990).
35 See generally J. M. Balkin, Cultural Software 9–10, 173–74 (1998)
(suggesting the need for an account of cultural influences that rests on psychological mechanisms operating at the individual level).
36 See Slovic et al., supra note 26.
37 See http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/content/view/86/100/ (last
visited Oct. 22, 2005).
38 See Ellen Peters, An Emotion-Based Model of Risk Perception and Stigma
Susceptibility: Cognitive Appraisals of Emotion, Affective Reactivity, Worldviews, and
Risk Perceptions in the Generation of Technological Stigma, 24 Risk Analysis 1349
(2004).
39 See Michael W. Allen & Sik Hung Ng, Human Values, Utilitarian Benefits and Identification: The Case of Meat, 33 Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37 (2003).
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chological accounts, that emotions are not thoughtless surges of
affect, but rather value-laden judgments shaped by social norms.40
A similar account can be given of “probability neglect.” Individuals display less sensitivity to the improbability of a bad outcome
when that outcome is attended by intensely negative affect. But
insofar as the valence and strength of individuals’ affective responses are influenced by their cultural appraisals of putatively
dangerous activities (guns, nuclear power plants, drug use, casual
sex, etc.), “probability neglect” will again be culture dependent.
“Availability,” too, is likely to be endogenous to culture. How
large they perceive risks to be depends on how readily individuals
can recall instances of misfortune associated with those risks. But
how likely someone is to take note of such a misfortune and to recall it almost certainly depends on her values: to avoid cognitive
dissonance, we are likely selectively to attend to information in a
way that reinforces rather than undermines our commitment to the
view that certain activities (say, gun possession, or economic commerce) are either virtuous or base.41
Culture will also condition the impact of social influences on
risk perception. The vast run of individuals are not in a position to
determine for themselves whether childhood vaccines induce autism, silicone breast implants cause immune dysfunction, private
firearm possession reduces or increases crime, and so on. Accordingly, they are obliged to trust others to tell them which risk claims,
supported by which forms of highly technical empirical evidence, to
believe. And the people they trust, not surprisingly, are the ones
40 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence
of Emotions (2001); see also Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 269 (1996) (examining
influence of cognitive conception of emotion in law).
41 See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A
Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1291, 1313–15
(2003); see also Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts
of Pollution and Taboo 39-40 (1966) (suggesting that cognitive-dissonance
might cause people to ignore harms by believing others are mistaken).
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who share their cultural worldviews — and who are likely to be
disposed to particular positions by virtue of affect, probability neglect, availability and similar mechanisms. Risk perceptions are
thus likely to be uniform within cultural groups and diverse across
them. Accordingly, group polarization and cascades are endogenous to culture, too.
A considerable body of recent empirical research supports this
account. Using a variety of methods, researchers have demonstrated the influence of cultural worldviews on perceptions of environmental risks, particularly those associated with nuclear power.42
We have conducted our own “National Risk and Culture Survey,” designed to establish the influence of cultural cognition on a
broad scale.43 The study utilized Douglas’s well-known typology,
which categorizes cultural ways of life along two cross-cutting dimensions, “group” and “grid.”44 Within “high group” ways of life,
individuals “interact frequently and in a wide range of activities” in
which they must “depend on each other,” a condition that “promotes values of solidarity”; in “low group” ways of life, in contrast,
individuals are expected to “fend for themselves and therefore tend
to be competitive.”45 Persons who participate in a “high grid” way
of life expect resources, opportunities, respect, and the like to be
42 See, e.g., Karl Dake, Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk: An
Analysis of Contemporary Worldviews and Cultural Biases, 22 J. Cross-Cultural
Psychol. 61 (1991); Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Modeling Stigma: An Empirical
Analysis of Nuclear Waste Images of Nevada, in Risk, Media, and Stigma: Understanding Public Challenges to Modern Science and Technology 107
(P.S. James Flynn, and Howard Kunreuther eds., 2001); Ellen Peters & Paul
Slovic, The Role of Affect and Worldviews as Orienting Dispositions in the Perception
and Acceptance of Nuclear Power, 26 J. Applied. Soc. Psychol. 1427, 1445–51
(1996).
43 See
National
Risk
&
Culture
Survey,
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/content/view/45/89/ (last visited Sept.
29, 2005) (providing background explaining how the researchers conducted the
survey and what the general findings were).
44 Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology viii

(1970).
45 Rayner, supra note 32, at 87–88.
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“distributed on the basis of explicit public social classifications,
such as sex, color, . . . holding a bureaucratic office, [or] descent in
a senior clan or lineage.”46 Those who adhere to a “low grid” way of
life favor a “state of affairs in which no one is prevented from participating in any social role because he or she is the wrong sex, or is
too old, or does not have the right family connections” and so
forth.47 After conducting an extensive review of ethnographic materials, conducting our own focus group discussions, and pretesting
a wide variety of survey items, we developed two highly reliable attitude scales, “Individualism-solidarism” and “Hierarchyegalitarianism,” which capture the key value conflicts among persons located in different quadrants of the group/grid typology.48
In a random national survey of 1800 persons, we used these
scales to measure the impact of cultural worldviews on a diverse
array of risk perceptions. Our results confirmed Douglas and Wildavsky’s (and other researchers’) conclusions on the relationship
between cultural worldviews and perceptions of environmental risk.
The more egalitarian and solidaristic persons become, the more
concerned they are about global warming, nuclear power, and pollution generally, whereas the more hierarchical and individualistic
persons become, the less concerned they are.49
We found a similar relationship between cultural worldviews
and perceptions of gun-related risks. Relatively egalitarian and solidaristic persons believe that widespread private ownership of guns
undermines public safety by increasing the incidence of crime and
gun accidents; relatively hierarchical and individualistic persons, by
contrast, believe that widespread restrictions on private gun ownership undermine public safety by rendering law-abiding persons un46 Jonathan L. Gross & Steve Rayner, Measuring Culture : A Paradigm for the Analysis of Social Organization 6 (1985).
47 Rayner, supra note 32, at 87.
48 See Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, John Gastil, Paul Slovic & C.K.
Mertz, Gender, Race, and Risk Perception 38 – 40 (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law &
Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper No. 86, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=723762.
49 See id. at 15.
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able to defend themselves from violent predation.50 These opposing
perceptions of gun risks cohere with the negative and positive social meanings that guns bear, respectively, for persons of these cultural orientations.51
Whereas individualists and hierarchists square off against solidarists and egalitarians on environmental and gun risks, on other
issues individualists and hierarchists part ways. Hierarchists worry,
for example, about the societal dangers of drug distribution, promiscuous sex, and the individual dangers of marijuana smoking;
individualists do not.52 Likewise, egalitarians and individualists are
not worried about the personal risks of obtaining an abortion or
contracting AIDS from surgery; hierarchists worry a great deal
about these risks.53 These patterns also conform to the logic of the
worldviews in question: hierarchists morally disapprove of behavior
that defies conventional norms, and thus naturally believe that deviant behavior is dangerous; egalitarians morally disapprove of
norms that rigidly stratify people, and individualists disapprove of
norms that constrain individual choice generally, so these types
naturally believe that deviant behavior is benign.
B. Cultural Evaluation vs. Rational and Irrational Weighing
The empirical evidence supporting the phenomenon of cultural cognition generates a distinct model of risk perception. We
call it the “cultural evaluator” model to emphasize the role that
cultural values play in determining not only which goods individuals are willing to take risks to obtain, but also which empirical
claims about risk they are likely to believe.

50 See id. at 18 – 21.
51 See Kahan & Braman, supra note 41, at 1299–1302.
52 The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, Cultural and Political Attitudes, http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/content/view/91/100/ (last
visited Sept. 29, 2005).
53 The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, Health Risk Perceptions, http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/content/view/102/100 (last visited
Nov. 17, 2005).
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This label also underscores what we take to be the descriptive
inappropriateness of suggesting that individual risk perceptions
typically embody any sort of expected-utility weighing, rational or
irrational. Indeed, for most persons, such weighing is completely
unnecessary: studies show that individuals’ perceptions of the benefits and risks of various putatively dangerous activities (from nuclear power to commercial aviation to handgun ownership) are inversely correlated.54 Guided by judgment-infused emotions, and
motivated by their need to preserve their fundamental ties to others, individuals naturally conform their perception of both the costs
and the benefits of such activities to the positive or negative social
meanings that cultural norms assign to those activities.
In sum, individuals adopt stances toward risks that express
their commitment to particular ways of life. Their risk perceptions
might or might not be accurate when evaluated from an actuarial
standpoint; policies based on them might or might not be in the
interest of society measured according to any welfarist metric. Nevertheless, which activities individuals view to be dangerous and
which policies they view to be effective embody coherent visions of
the good society and the virtuous life.
III. Culturally Evaluating Sunstein
We’ve suggested that Sunstein’s conception of the irrationalweigher model is inattentive to the phenomenon of cultural cognition. We now consider how this inattention detracts from Sunstein’s diagnosis of the pathologies that afflict risk perceptions and
his recommended institutional cures.
A. Descriptive Deficiencies
Sunstein’s descriptive account of risk perception draws a sharp
distinction between public risk assessments and expert ones. The
54 See Slovic, supra note 10, at 404–05 (noting that many people associate
high benefit actions with low risks, and vice versa); The Cultural Cognition Project
at
Yale
Law
School,
Gun
Risk
Attitudes,
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/index.php?option=content&task=vie
w&id=99 (last visited Sept. 24, 2005) (noting the same inverse correlation with
perceptions of gun risks).
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former are distorted by various cognitive and social dynamics that
impel lay persons to fixate obsessively on risks of high emotional
salience but often minimal consequence, and to disregard more serious threats to societal well-being. The latter, in contrast, are
characterized by the balance and accuracy associated with the
calmer and more analytic modes of System II reasoning.
The cultural evaluator model suggests a richer and more nuanced picture that accounts for certain phenomena that Sunstein’s
irrational-weigher model does not satisfactorily explain. These include systematic differences in risk perceptions among lay persons;
the clustering of public risk perceptions across seemingly discrete
issues; systematic differences of opinion among risk experts; and
the intensity of political conflict surrounding risk regulation.
1. Individual Differences. — Lay persons disagree not only with
experts but also with one another about the magnitude of various
risks. These disagreements, moreover, are far from random. They
highly correlate with characteristics such as gender, race, political
orientation, and religion, and they persist even after controlling for
education and other information-related influences.55
These systematic individual differences pose an obvious challenge to the rational-weigher model of risk perception. The idea
that individuals respond to risk in a manner that maximizes their
expected utility certainly allows for heterogeneity in the benefits
individuals attach to risky activities. But if individuals, in aggregate
and over time, are rationally processing information about risk, differences in their estimations of the magnitude of risky activities
should essentially just be noise — products of random variation
that display no intelligible patterns across persons.
The irrational-weigher model also fails to explain such differences. It’s implausible to think that men are more or less vulnerable
than women, whites more or less vulnerable than minorities, Republicans more or less vulnerable than Democrats, or Catholics
more or less vulnerable than Protestants or Jews to the distorting
55 See Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 48 (presenting
data showing influence of various individual characteristics on risk perceptions).
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influence of “availability,” “probability neglect,” “status quo bias,”
“affect,” and the like.56
To his credit, Sunstein’s particular emphasis on social influences does suggest a reason why risk perceptions might vary crossculturally. Even initially “small or random” differences in the distribution of perceptions across space will predictably grow in intensity
and ultimately become sharply pronounced as a result of “availability cascades” and “group polarization” (p. 96):
Because different social influences can be found in different
communities, local variations are inevitable, with different examples becoming salient in each. Hence such variations — between,
say, New York and Ohio, or England and the United States, or
between Germany and France — might involve coincidence . . . .
Indeed the different reactions to nuclear power in France and the
United States can be explained in large part in this way. And
when some groups concentrate on cases in which guns increased
violence, and others on cases in which guns decreased violence,
availability cascades are a large part of the reason. “Many Germans believe that drinking water after eating cherries is deadly;
they also believe that putting ice in soft drinks is unhealthy. The
English, however, rather enjoy a cold drink of water after some
cherries; and Americans love icy refreshments.” (p. 96)57

But as Sunstein’s own description suggests, this type of “cultural” account predicts that group differences should be largely geographic in nature. If salient or gripping examples of misfortune (as
well as overrepresented opinions or arguments) spread from one
person to another within geographic communities — in much the
same way that an infectious disease does — there would be little
56 Researchers have explicitly ruled out such differences in the case of
gender. See, e.g., Charles R. Berger, Eun-Ju Lee & Joel T. Johnson, Gender, Rationality, and Base-Rate Explanations for Increasing Trends, 30 Comm. Res. 737,
758 (2003); Stuart J. McKelvie, The Availability Heuristic: Effects of Fame and
Gender on the Estimated Frequency of Male and Female Names, 137 J. Soc. Psych.
63 (1997); Craig W. Trumbo, Information Processing and Risk Perception: An Adaptation of the Heuristic-Systematic Model, 52 J. Comm. 367, 379 (2002).
57 The author quotes Joseph Heinrich et al., Group Report: What is the Role
of Culture in Bounded Rationality?, in Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive
Toolbox 343, 353 (G. Gigerenzer & R. Selten eds., 2001).
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reason to expect Jews, African Americans, and women in New
York to be more like Jews, African Americans, and women in Ohio
than they are like Protestants, whites, and men in New York. But
in fact religious, racial, and gender effects persist even when region
is controlled for.
Of course, random variations within other, non-geographic
communities — professional or occupational ones, for example, or
perhaps internet “discussion groups” comprising persons with common vocational or political interests — might also blossom into systematic differences in risk perception as individuals within those
communities interact. But it’s necessary to resort to fairly complex
and largely ad hoc conjectures to link differences of these sorts to
the well defined forms of variation we actually see across social
groups.
The cultural evaluator model, in contrast, suggests a coherent
and parsimonious explanation for such variation. That model explicitly posits that risk perceptions will vary across persons in patterns that reflect and reinforce their cultural worldviews. Gender,
ethnicity, religion, political orientation and like characteristics correlate with such outlooks.58 It follows that cultural variation in risk
perception will manifest itself in systematic differences in risk perception across different social groups.
The results of our own National Risk and Culture Survey confirm this conclusion. Consistent with previous research, we found
that factors such as income, education, community type (rural or
58 See Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 48, at 6–7. For
this reason, these and similar demographic characteristics are commonly used as
proxies for distinctive cultural norms. See, e.g., Raymond D. Gastil, Cultural
Regions of the United States (1975) (charting regional correlates with cultural
values); Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and
Women’s Development (1982) (using gender as indicator of commitment to
compatible moral sensibilities); Richard E. Nisbett & Dov Cohen, Culture of
Honor 1 – 2 (1996) (using region of residence as representative of a shared cultural and psychological background); Gary Kleck, Crime, Culture Conflict and the
Sources of Support for Gun Control: A Multilevel Application of the General Social
Surveys, 39 Am. Behav. Scientist. 387 (1996) (using race, class, gender, and
region as proxies for cultural norms).
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urban), political ideology, and personality type do predict various
risk perceptions. But we also found that cultural worldviews exert
significantly and substantially more predictive power than these
characteristics. Seemingly significant gender and race variances in
risk perception also turn out to be an artifact of culture-specific differences in risk perception related to gender and race differences in
social roles relating to putatively dangerous activities within hierarchic and (to a lesser extent) individualist ways of life.59
Indeed, even the sorts of geographic variations that Sunstein
focuses on are best understood as reflecting variance in cultural
commitments over space. The difference between French and U.S.
attitudes toward nuclear power, and the resulting differences in the
regulatory postures of the two nations, are hardly a matter of “coincidence” or chance. In contrast to members of the public in the
United States, members of the public in France are much more
likely to hold a hierarchical worldview.60 This difference not only
disposes the French to be more accepting of nuclear power risks,
but also to be more confident in the ability of technical and governmental elites to manage any such risks.61
In other words, membership in various social groups (including
sometimes entire nations) predicts risk perceptions only because
those groups are proxies for culture. Moreover, because they are
only proxies, their unique influence fades to insignificance in a
model that directly accounts for cultural worldviews.
2. Belief Clustering. — Risk perceptions not only vary systematically across social groups; they also cohere across seemingly discrete issues. How likely one is to perceive global warming to be a
threat, for example, predicts how much one worries about gun acci-

59 See Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 48, at 16–18.
60 See Paul Slovic, James Flynn, C.K. Mertz, Marc Poumadere & Claire
Mays, Nuclear Power and the Public: A Comparative Study of Risk Perception in
France and the United States, in Cross-Cultural Risk Perception: A Survey of
Empirical Studies 93-94 (O. Renn and B. Rohrmann eds., 2000).
61 See id. at 87–89, 90, 93–94, 98.
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dents, which in turn tells us whether one regards abortion as a dangerous medical procedure, and marijuana as a dangerous drug.62
This feature of public risk perceptions also defies the conventional models. Because as an empirical matter nothing about the
size of any one of these risks entails anything about the size of any
other, we wouldn’t expect persons behaving like rational weighers
to divide into opposing groups on these matters. Nor is it at all
clear why persons behaving like irrational weighers would form
these particular packages of risk perceptions. Nothing in the relative salience, familiarity, or evocative imagery of any one of these
risks is connected in any logical or practical way to those features of
the others. There’s also nothing intrinsic to Sunstein’s irrationalweigher model that should lead us to expect those who do or don’t
take seriously one of these risks (say, of global warming or of marijuana use) to be any more likely to exchange information with others who do or don’t take seriously some other risk (say, of gun accidents or of health complications from abortion).
The cultural evaluator model, in contrast, readily explains belief clustering. The meanings of these diverse risks — the values expressed by the activities that give rise to the risks, and by government regulation of the same — might cohere in perfectly sensible
ways. The idea that guns are dangerous and worthy of regulation,
for example, threatens hierarchical roles and denigrates individualist virtues; the threat of global warming impugns the competence of
hierarchical elites and invites interference with markets and other
forms of private orderings that individualists prize. It is therefore
perfectly sensible to expect hierarchists and individualists to believe
both that guns are not dangerous and global warming is not a serious threat, and for egalitarians and solidarists to believe otherwise.
Our data found this very pattern, and others that reflect the expressive coherence of these opposing worldviews.63

62 See Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 48, at 24–28..
63 See supra text at notes 49–52. See generally Dan M. Kahan & Donald
Braman, The Cultural Cognition of Public Policy Yale L. & Pub. Policy Rev.
(forthcoming 2005).
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3. Experts. — Sunstein’s account seeks to identify the mechanisms that impel members of the public wildly to overestimate the
importance of risks that experts view with much less concern. But
experts themselves are hardly of one mind about societal risks.
Nearly every public belief cited by Sunstein as a product of some
public “risk panic” — that nuclear power is dangerous, that arsenic
in drinking water poses a health threat, that “mad cow” disease is a
serious concern — is shared by some scientists and rejected by others.64
Expert disagreement per se does not necessarily defy Sunstein’s
account. The empirical evidence surrounding many important societal risks is often conflicting and in some instances very scant.
Employing the methodical and dispassionate forms of analysis associated with System II reasoning, experts could well come to different conclusions in these circumstances.
The problem, however, is that the nature of expert disagreement belies this account of its causes. As is true of disagreement
among members of the public generally, disagreements among risk
experts are distributed in patterns that cannot plausibly be linked
either to access to information or capacity to understand it. Gen64 On nuclear power, see Nuclear Power: Both Sides (Michio Kaku &
Jennifer Trainer, eds., 1992). On arsenic, compare National Research Council
Committee on Toxicology, Arsenic in Drinking Water: 2001 Update 214
(2001) (concluding based on epidemiological studies that arsenic exposure
within existing regulatory standards might significantly increase cancer risk) with
M.N. Bates, A.H. Smith, & K.P. Cantor, Case-Control Study of Bladder Cancer
and Arsenic in Drinking Water, 141 Am. J. Epidemiology 523 (1995) (concluding
that cities with levels of drinking water arsenic below and above existing standards do not differ in incidence of cancer). On mad cow disease, compare Top
Scientist: Test All Cows for Mad Cow Disease, UPI Newsire, Mar. 17, 2004 (reporting view of Nobel Prize-winning scientist who discovered mad cow infectious
agent that the disease is “the greatest threat to the safety of the human food supply in modern times”) with Joshua T. Cohen et al., Evaluation of the Potential for
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (October 2003), available at
http://www.hcra.harvard.edu/pdf/madcow.pdf (“[E]ven if BSE were somehow to
arise in the U.S., few additional animals would become infected, little infectivity
would be available for potential human exposure, and the disease would be
eradicated. In short, the U.S. appears very resistant to a BSE challenge . . . .”).
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der, for example, predicts systematic differences in risk perception
among experts,65 as do political ideology and institutional affiliation
(academic vs. industrial).66 Because these sorts of characteristics
are all plausible proxies for cultural orientation, variance along
these lines suggests that cultural cognition is figuring in expert
judgments of risk, too. Research that one of us has conducted (independent of the National Risk and Culture Survey) supports exactly this conclusion.67
There are at least two possible ways in which cultural cognition could be exerting this impact on expert risk assessments. One
is that cultural worldviews might induce experts, like members of
the public generally, to engage in heuristic or System I forms of reasoning pervaded by biases such as availability and probability neglect.
But a second and even more plausible explanation is that cultural worldviews are biasing the more reflective System II forms of
reasoning associated with expert judgment. Sunstein maintains
that System II reasoning is “more likely to be error free” because it
is “more deliberative [and] calculative” (p. 68). But a wealth of research on dual-process reasoning suggests that the truth is much
more complicated. System II often furnishes less reliable guidance
than heuristic-driven System I reasoning.68 Among the reasons this

65 See, e.g., Richard P. Barke, Hank Jenkins-Smith, & Paul Slovic, Risk
Perceptions of Men and Women Scientists, 78 Social Science Quarterly 167, 172–
75 (1997).
66 See Slovic, supra note 10, at 286, 311–12.
67 See id. at 406–09 (describing studies in which cultural worldviews explained variance among scientists). Douglas Kysar and James Salzman convincingly attribute expert as well as public disagreement over risk to conflicting
worldviews in Environmental Tribalism, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1099, 1111 – 16
(2003).
68 See, e.g., Slovic et al., supra note 26, at 320 (noting that expert chess
players and mathematicians perform better when relying on tacit or heuristic
rather than purely analytic reasoning and arguing that “risk as feeling may outperform risk as analysis” in settings such as security screening at airports).
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is so is the vulnerability of even System II reasoning to various biasing influences.69
One such influence is known as defense motivation.70 Information that challenges beliefs essential to one’s group identity is
known to pose a threat to individuals’ perceptions of their status.
To repel that threat, individuals (subconsciously) screen arguments
and evidence in a way protective of their existing beliefs. Such
screening, it has been shown, operates whether individuals are engaged in either heuristic reasoning or more reflective reasoning.71 In
effect, defense motivation biases individuals’ use of System II reasoning, causing them to use deliberate, calculating, and methodical
analysis to support beliefs dominant within their group and to debunk challenges to those beliefs.72
This is most likely the dynamic that generates group-based disagreement among risk experts. Like members of the general public,
experts are inclined to form attitudes toward risk that best express
their cultural visions. The only difference, if any, is that experts are
more likely to use System II reasoning to do so.
4. Politics. — Highly charged disputes occupy a conspicuous
position in our society’s political life. How (if at all) to respond to
global warming, whether to enact or repeal gun control laws, what
69 See, e.g., Shelly Chaiken & Durairaj Maheswaran, Heuristic Processing
Can Bias Systematic Processing: Effects of Source Credibility, Argument Ambiguity,
and Task Importance on Attitude Judgment, 66 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 460
(1994); Serena Chen, Kimberly Duckworth & Shelly Chaiken, Motivated Heuristic and Systematic Processing, 10 Psychol. Inquiry 44 (1999).
70 See Roger Giner-Sorolla & Shelly Chaiken, Selective Use of Heuristic and
Systematic Processing Under Defense Motivation, 23 Personality & Soc. Psychol.
Bull. 84, 85 (1997).
71 See id. at 85–86; see also Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party Over Policy: The
Dominating Impact of Group Influence on Political Beliefs, 85 J. Personality & Soc.
Psychol. 808 (2003) (finding that experimental subjects using systematic reasoning are still disposed to credit arguments conditional on sharing a group allegiance with the source of the arguments).
72 See Serena Chen, Kimberly Duckworth & Shelly Chaiken, Motivated
Heuristic and Systematic Processing, 10 Psychol. Inq. 44, 45 (1999).
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sorts of policies to adopt to combat domestic terrorism, and like
issues generate intense public conflict. The power to explain the
prevalence of intense conflict over risk regulation is another advantage of the cultural evaluator model over Sunstein’s irrational
weigher model.
To be sure, the centrality of risk regulation in democratic politics is perfectly compatible with Sunstein’s position. Many risk
regulation issues are of obvious consequence to the well-being of
society. Moreover, because such issues usually involve highly gripping and evocative instances of harm, they predictably trigger a
self-reinforcing wave of public anxiety to which democratically accountable institutions inevitably react (indeed, overreact).73
What confounds Sunstein’s account, however, is the highly
conflictual nature of risk regulation politics. If public attention were
being driven solely by mechanisms like availability, probability neglect, cascades, and group polarization, we would expect members
of the public and democratically accountable government officials
to be uniformly impelled toward increasingly restrictive forms of
regulation of the sort counseled by the “precautionary principle.”
This is exactly the sort of story, in fact, that Stephen Breyer, Sunstein’s irrational-weigher comrade in arms, tells about the regulatory process.74 But the truth is that risk regulation politics are not
nearly so one-sided. Public demand for regulatory responses to
global warming, gun accidents, terrorism, and similar sources of risk
generates equally intense public opposition to the same.
This is exactly the state of affairs one would predict under the
cultural evaluator model. As a result of cultural cognition, individuals of diverse cultural persuasions are endowed with competing
affective responses toward putatively dangerous activities, and are
thus impelled to adopt opposing stances on risk issues.
The cultural evaluator model not only explains why risk regulation politics are conflictual, but also why those on both sides ad73 See text at notes 26–27.
74 See Breyer, supra note 14, at 33 – 51.
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vance their positions with such intensity. Sociologist Joseph Gusfield describes as symbolic “status conflicts” political disputes in
which the adherents of opposing cultural styles compete for esteem.75 In such struggles, opposing cultural groups mobilize to enact legislation that “glorifies the values of one group and demeans
those of another,” thereby “enhanc[ing] the social status of. . . the
affirmed culture” at the expense of the one “condemned as deviant.”76 Because individuals care as much about their status as they
do about their material welfare, “[t]he struggle to control the symbolic actions of government is often as bitter and fateful as the
struggle to control its tangible effects.”77 Important historical examples include battles over temperance and civil rights;78 contemporary examples include the ongoing battles over capital punishment,79 gay rights,80 and hate crime laws.81
Disputes over risk regulation fit this pattern. Because they
evocatively symbolize the worldviews of hierarchists and egalitarians, individualists and solidarists, regulations of drugs, guns, sexual
promiscuity, and other putatively dangerous activities inevitably
come to signify whose stock is up and whose down in the incessant
competition for social esteem. What seem like highly technical and
often highly uncertain empirical disputes among experts galvanize
75 Joseph R. Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the
American Temperance Movement, 21 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter Gusfield,
Symbolic Crusade]; Joseph R. Gusfield, On Legislating Morals: The Symbolic
Process of Designating Deviance, 56 Cal. L. Rev. 54 (1968) [hereinafter Gusfield,
Designating Deviance].
76 Gusfield, Designating Deviance, supra note 75, at 57–59.
77 Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade, supra note 75, at 167.
78 See Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade, supra note 75, at 22–24.
79 See, e.g., Barbara Ann Stolz, Congress and Capital Punishment: An Exercise in Symbolic Politics, 5 L. & Pol. Q. 157 (1983).
80 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts
Can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 Yale L.J. 1279,
1289–92 (2005).
81 See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv. L.
Rev. 413, 463–67 (1999).
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the public because they are in truth the “the product of an ongoing
debate about the ideal society.”82
B. Normative/Prescriptive Deficiencies
Although Sunstein purports to be reconciling risk regulation
with “deliberative democracy,” his proposed regulatory reforms are
neither particularly deliberative nor particularly democratic. Sunstein’s central prescription is to redirect risk regulation from “highly
representative institutions” to “more insulated” experts (p. 126).
Rather than try to inject scientifically sound information into public discourse, government officials should endeavor to “[c]hange the
subject” — “to discuss something else” (p. 125) in order to divert
public attention away from “facts that will predictably cause high
levels of alarm” (p. 123). The cultural evaluator model supports an
approach to risk regulation that is much more consistent with participatory and deliberative visions of democracy.
1. Information and Cultural Identity Affirmation. — To start,
Sunstein is likely far too pessimistic about the possibility of public
education. Sunstein’s preference for distracting rather than educating the public reflects his assumption that ordinary citizens lack the
time and capacity to process information through reflective System
II forms of reasoning as opposed to heuristic-driven System I ones.
As we have emphasized, Sunstein overstates the accuracy of System II reasoning relative to System I.83 But even more important,
because he fails to perceive the endogeneity of risk-perception
mechanisms to culture, Sunstein overlooks the possibility of riskcommunication techniques that make System II reasoning itself
responsive to scientifically sound information.
The best work in dual-process reasoning supports the conclusion that individuals are motivated by a form of status anxiety to
resist information that portends regulatory action denigrating of
their cultural values.84 It follows that individuals can be made more
82 Douglas & Wildavsky, supra note 33, at 36.
83 See text at notes 68–72.
84 See Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 48.
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receptive to such information when it is communicated to them in
forms that affirm their status. Research by social psychologists
Geoffrey Cohen, Joshua Aronson, and Claude Steele, for example,
shows that individuals are much more willing to change their
minds on charged issues like the death penalty and abortion when
they are first exposed to self-affirming information, such as their
high performance on a test or their possession of some desirable
personal attribute.85 Self-affirmation of this sort buffers the threat
to self that otherwise motivates individuals to resist acceptance of
information at odds with beliefs dominant within their identitydefining group.86
There is a political analog of this self-affirmation effect. It involves affirming the selves of those who might resist information
about a societal danger by tying that information to a proposed policy solution that itself affirms the resisters’ cultural commitments.
For a plausible historical example, consider the softening of
conservative opposition to air pollution regulation in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. Individualists tend to resist the idea that commerce threatens the environment, because that conclusion implies
that society ought to constrain market behavior and like forms of
private ordering. Yet when the idea of tradable emission permits —
a market solution to the problem of air pollution — was devised
during the highly individualist Bush I Administration,87 pro-market
85 See Geoffrey L. Cohen, Joshua Aronson & Claude M. Steele, When

Beliefs Yield to Evidence: Reducing Biased Evaluation by Affirming the Self, 26 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 1151 (2000).
86 See id. See generally David K. Sherman & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Accepting

Threatening Information: Self-Affirmation and the Reduction of Defensive Biases, 11
Current Directions in Psychol. Sci. 119 (2002). See also Geoffrey L. Cohen,
David K. Sherman, Michelle McGoey, Lillian Hsu, Anthony Bastardi & Lee
Ross, Bridging the Partisan Divide: Self-Affirmation Reduces Ideological ClosedMindedness and Inflexibility (Sept. 10, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available
at
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/documents/cohen_self_affirmation_dra
ft.pdf.
87 See Project 88, Harnessing Market Forces to Protect Our Environ-

ment: Initiatives for the New President 26 – 29 (Timothy E. Wirth & John
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forces in the Republican Party stopped resisting. Shown a solution
that affirmed their cultural values, it became easier, cognitively, for
individualists to accept the idea that there was a problem to be
dealt with after all. Hierarchists, who tend to resist claims of environmental danger as implicit criticisms of social elites, also likely
felt affirmed by a policy that promised to improve air quality by
empowering rather than constraining commercial firms.88
For a contemporary example, consider the global warming
controversy. The assertion of this risk is also seen by individualists
as threatening the autonomy of markets and by hierarchists as impugning the competence of social and governmental elites. Consequently, both downplay the threat posed by global warming (or its
very existence). But recently, groups of varying ideologies have
started to tout renewed investment in nuclear power as a way to
reduce the fossil fuel emissions primarily responsible for global
warming.89 The self-affirmation effect described by Cohen and his
collaborators suggests why this strategy might work. Individualists
and hierarchists both support nuclear power, which is emblematic
of the very cultural values that are threatened by society’s recognition of the global warming threat. Shown a solution that affirms
their identities, individualists and hierarchists can be expected to
Heinz sponsors) (1988); Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn from the Grand
Policy Experiment? Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading, 12 J. Econ. Persp. 69, 76
(1998).
88 Although the policy was initially proposed by environmentalists who
broke with the conventional egalitarian and solidaristic fear of using market
mechanisms to induce risk abatement, see, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & Richard
Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives,
13 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 171, 178 – 88 (1988), Bush seized on this approach to
deflect Democratic Party attacks on his commitment to the environment without alienating his conservative, pro-business base. See Robert W. Hahn & Robert
N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old
Idea? 18 Ecology L.Q. 1, 28 (1991); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Student Article, Emissions
Allowance Trading Under the Clean Air Act: A Model for Future Environmental
Regulations?, 7 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 352, 363–64 (1999).
89 See Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed, Nukes Are Green, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9,
2005, at A19; Craig Gilbert, Cheney argues case for nuclear plants, Milwaukee
Journal Sentinel, June 14, 2001, at 16A.
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display less resistance — not just politically, but cognitively — to
the proposition that global warming is a problem after all.
Indeed, when egalitarians and solidarists are exposed to the
message that nuclear power can reduce global warming, they are
likely to perceive nuclear power to be less dangerous. The affirmation of their identity associated with recognition of the global
warming threat reduces a cognitive impediment to accepting information that they have long resisted about nuclear safety.
In these examples, we have assumed scientific consensus that
both air pollution and global warming are serious environmental
threats and that nuclear power is reasonably safe. But in conditions
of scientific uncertainty, the same strategy of cultural-identity affirmation could be used to make a culturally diverse public receptive to whatever empirical information might eventually emerge in
support of policies that advance society’s shared interests. Comparative law scholar Mary Ann Glendon, for example, discusses an
abortion law in France that simultaneously affirmed the identity of
hierarchists, by permitting abortion not on demand but only in circumstances of “personal emergency,” and the identity of egalitarians and individualists, by treating an individual woman’s declaration of personal emergency as effectively unreviewable by government officials.90 According to Glendon, this legislation dissipated
cultural conflict and created a climate in which both sides came to
accept previously disputed factual information about the efficacy of
certain social welfare policies in reducing demand for abortion.91
We can imagine a similar strategy to promote receptivity to
sound information on gun risks. Egalitarians and solidarists focus
on the risk that too little gun control will increase the incidence of
gun accidents and crimes, hierarchists and individualists on the risk
that too much will render law-abiding persons unable to defend
themselves from criminal predation.92 We will assume that the
90 See Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law 15

(1987).
91 See id. at 15 – 20.
92 See Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 48.
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state of the empirical evidence — which is voluminous and conflicting93 — does not now support a confident conclusion either
way. Nevertheless, a policy those on both sides might accept is a
“bounty,” in the form of a tax rebate or other monetary reward, for
individuals who register handguns.
A “registration bounty” would affirm the cultural identities of
both control supporters and control opponents simultaneously because both could see it as an effective and fair solution to a collective action problem, albeit a different one for each group. For control supporters, the relevant public good is the reduction of gun
crime; registration contributes to that good by making it easier to
trace the ownership of weapons used to commit crimes. Consistent
with egalitarian and solidarist sensibilities, control supporters can
thus envision the bounty as a means of equitably compensating individuals for being made to bear a burden that benefits society at
large. For control opponents, in contrast, the relevant public good
is the reduction of violent crime in a community in which a relatively high proportion of individuals own guns. Because they do not
believe individuals should be expected to endure disproportionate
burdens to benefit society at large, individualists will think it is perfectly appropriate to compensate individual gun owners for the
contribution they are making to public safety generally. So will
hierarchists, who can see the bounty as a fitting public acknowledgement of the virtuous willingness of gun owners to promote the
common good.94
Agreement of any sort might be viewed as a step forward in
the American gun policy stalemate. But the real payoff is opening
the public’s mind to facts. Any policy that affirms the identities of
93 Compare, e.g., John R. Lott Jr., More Guns, Less Crime: Understanding Crime and Gun-Control Laws (2d ed. 2000), with Ian Ayres & John J.
Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime” Hypothesis, 55 Stan. L.
Rev. 1193 (2003).
94 For an elaboration of this proposal and others aimed at resolving the
cultural impasse over guns in American society, see Donald Braman & Dan M.
Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the Fear of Gun Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun Debate, Emory L.J. (forthcoming 2006).
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culturally diverse citizens simultaneously makes all of them more
receptive to information that they might otherwise have found
lacking in credibility. Accordingly, the lesson for risk communicators isn’t that they have to “change the subject” so much as change
the discourse to make new empirical findings compatible with a
plurality of worldviews.
2. Cultural Cognition and Deliberative Debiasing. -— In Sunstein’s view, any attempt to undertake such public discussions
would lead inexorably to mass polarization, with preexisting biases
amplifying themselves in the echo chamber of mass media or even
the confines of a face-to-face discussion. Such a result might occur,
but to say it is inevitable underestimates people’s discursive capacities, and as a result misses the potential they have to counteract the
biasing effects of cultural cognition.
Research on the polarizing effect of deliberation on political
decisionmaking is actually quite mixed. Indeed, a formidable body
of empirical research also shows that deliberation at least sometimes generates convergence and moderation of opinion.95 Groupcommunication researchers have cataloged various procedures that
help to ameliorate polarization.96 In many political decisionmaking
95 See John Gastil, Laura Black & Kara Moscovitz, Group and Individual

Differences in Deliberative Experience: A Study of Ideology, Attitude Change, and
Deliberation in Small Face-to-Face Groups, Pol. Comm. (forthcoming 2006); Alan
Gerber & Donald Green, Misperceptions About Perceptual Bias, 2 Ann. Rev. Pol.
Sci. 189 (1999); Norbert L. Kerr, Robert J. MacCoun & Geoffrey P. Kramer,
Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 Psychol. Rev. 687
(1996); Choon-Ling Sia, Bernard C.Y. Tan, and Kwok-Kee Wei, Group Polarization and Computer-Mediated Communication: Effects of Communication Cues, Social
Presence, and Anonymity, 13 Info. Sys. Res. 70 (2002).
96 For detailed descriptions of such procedures, see Ned Crosby & Doug

Nethercut, Citizens Juries: Creating a Trustworthy Voice of the People,” in The Deliberative Democracy Handbook 112 – 15 (John Gastil & Peter Levine eds.,
2005); James Fishkin & Cynthia Farrar, Deliberative Polling: From Experiment to
Community Resource, in The Deliberative Democracy Handbook, supra, at 72–
75; Carolyn M. Hendriks, Consensus Conferences and Planning Cells: Lay Citizen
Deliberations, in The Deliberative Democracy Handbook, supra, at 83–89;
Carolyn J. Lukensmeyer, Joe Goldman & Steven Brigham, A Town Meeting for
the Twenty-First Century, in The Deliberative Democracy Handbook, supra, at
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contexts, such procedures have been used to promote successful
deliberative solutions on many issues that are culturally fraught.97
These procedures work, in part, because they help to dissipate
the potential of cultural cognition to generate conflict. First, carefully structured deliberation does sometimes appear to enable individuals to engage in a culturally debiased form of System II reasoning.98 Political scientist James Fishkin has developed deliberative
processes, such as the Deliberative Poll, that use expert moderators
whose intervention appears at least sometimes to induce citizens to
change their minds on contested issues of fact.99 The Twenty-First
Century Town Meeting, a deliberative format designed by Carolyn
Lukensmeyer, uses similar techniques and has generated similar
results.100
Deliberation might also sometimes improve public information
processing by forging a shared civic identity alternative to individu-

157–60; Harris Sokoloff, Harris M. Steinberg & Steven N. Pyser, Deliberative
City Planning on the Philadelphia Waterfront, in The Deliberative Democracy
Handbook, supra, at 187–91. See generally John Gastil, By Popular Demand
165–71 (2000) (proposing techniques for counteracting conformity pressure, low
motivation, and information deficits).
97 See W. Barnett Pearce & Stephen W. Littlejohn, Moral Conflict:
When Social Worlds Collide (1997); Norman Dale, Cross-Cultural CommunityBased Planning: Negotiating the Future of Haida Gwaii (British Columbia), in The
Consensus Building Handbook, supra, at 923; John Forester, Dealing with Deep
Value Differences, in The Consensus Building Handbook: A Comprehensive
Guide to Reaching Agreement 463 (Lawrence Susskind, Sarah McKearnan &
Jennifer Thomas-Larmer eds., 1999); Christopher Winship, Policy Analysis as
Puzzle-Solving, in Oxford Handbook of Public Policy (Michael Moran, Robert
E. Goodin and Martin Rein eds., 2006).
98 See John Gastil & James P. Dillard, Increasing Political Sophistication
Through Public Deliberation, 16 Pol. Comm. 3, 19–21 (1999).
99 See Fishkin & Farrar, supra note 96, at 72–75. See generally Bruce Ackerman & James S. Fishkin, Deliberation Day 44–59 (2004); James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform
(1991).
100

See Lukensmeyer, Goldman & Brigham, supra note 96, at 157–60.
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als’ cultural affiliations.101 Individuals tend to find the members of
any in-group more credible than the members of any out-group.102
The evidence we have collected on culture and risk suggests that
cultural affinity is the dominant in-group when individuals appraise
risk. But as they engage one another in earnest face-to-face deliberation, individuals committed to resolving an important common
problem typically form strong emotional bonds.103 It’s plausible to
imagine that these connections generate a group identity that, for
the period of deliberation at least, displaces cultural affiliations as
individuals’ dominant reference point. If so, we might expect individuals, while they are deliberating together, to experience relief
from the sense of threat to self that makes them resist information
at odds with their culturally grounded prior beliefs. This effect
could explain the consensus that some researchers and practitioners report among participants in deliberation experiments.104

101 See Stephanie Burkhalter, John Gastil & Todd Kelshaw, A Conceptual
Definition and Theoretical Model of Public Deliberation in Small Face-to-Face
Groups, 12 Comm. Theory 398, 415–16 (2002).
102 See, e.g., Russell D. Clark, III & Anne Maass, The Role of Social Categorization and Perceived Source Credibility in Minority Influence, 18 Eur. J. Soc.
Psychol. 381, 388–92 (1988); Diane M. Mackie, Leila T. Worth & Arlene G.
Asuncion, Processing of Persuasive In-Group Messages, 58 J. Personality & Soc.
Psychol. 812, 820–21 (1990).
103 See, e.g., Pearce & Littlejohn, supra note 97, at 151 – 67; Fishkin &
Farrar, supra note 96, at 68 – 70; Keith Melville, Taylor L. Willingham & John
R. Dedrick, National Issues Forums: A Network of Communities Promoting Public
Deliberation, in The Deliberative Democracy Handbook, supra note 96, at 37,
37–39, 45–51.
104 Consider one real-world experiment, the British Columbia Citizens’
Assembly on Electoral Reform, which resulted in a 146 – 7 final vote. The Citizens’ Assembly was made up of 160 randomly-selected citizens, one man and one
woman from each electoral district plus two at-large Aboriginal members. The
Assembly voted to replace the existing electoral system with a Single Transferable Vote model, which lets voters rank candidates. The Assembly’s plan
emerged from months of face-to-face deliberation and hearings, which are accessible
online.
Citizens’
Assembly
on
Electoral
Reform,
http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca (last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
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Finally, deliberation has the potential to alter individuals’ understandings of the relationship between their cultural affiliations
and particular beliefs. On this view, what individuals learn in the
course of deliberation isn’t so much new information about the
facts being debated but rather new information about the identities
of those who hold particular factual beliefs. If participants come to
see either that a particular belief is less dominant among their cultural peers than they had imagined or that cultural peers who deviate from the dominant belief are not censured as severely as they
had anticipated, participants are likely to revise their view about
the social cost — or more accurately the social meaning105 — of
changing their mind.
This conjecture is supported by a number of other recognized
psychological processes. One is the false consensus effect, which refers to the tendency of individuals to form an exaggerated sense of
the degree to which members of their referent group hold a particular position.106 This bias is likely to generate a self-sustaining condition of pluralistic ignorance to the extent that individuals are motivated to represent their adherence of this belief to others, who will
in turn feel constrained to represent that they hold the belief, notwithstanding widespread reservations.107 Deliberation might conceivably break this cycle of shared misunderstanding if, contrary to
expectations, individuals discover that others who share their
group identity do not in fact uniformly hold the belief in question.108 As they revise downward their estimation of how prevalent
the view is within their group, individuals will feel less threatened
105

See Cohen, supra note 71.

106 See, e.g., George A. Quattrone & Edward E. Jones, The Perception of
Variability Within In-Groups and Out-Groups: Implications for the Law of Small
Numbers, 38 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 141, 149–51 (1980).
107 See, e.g., Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T. Miller, Pluralistic Ignorance
and Alcohol Use on Campus: Some Consequences of Misperceiving the Social Norm,
64 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 243, 244 (1993).
108 Cf. David Matza, Delinquency and Drift 52–55 (1964) (suggesting
this process as one of the mechanisms that steers delinquent youths toward lawabiding behavior over time).
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by, and thus become more receptive to, information at odds with
their prior culturally grounded belief.109
Although it is admittedly speculative, this account of how deliberation can ameliorate the distorting influence of cultural cognition is nonetheless supported by one real-world approach to risk
management. Social psychologist Robin Gregory has devised deliberative procedures aimed at generating “science-based, communitysupported” environmental risk policies.110 In what he calls “structured, value-focused” decisionmaking, interested parties from the
affected community first deliberate on ends in a manner that exposes rather than suppresses their underlying values. Expert risk
analysts and trained facilitators then join the discussion to help the
stakeholders to identify courses of action that reconcile various
combinations of values and to evaluate the costs (fiscal and environmental) of those options.111 Gregory presents empirical evidence showing that this approach generates outcomes that are
more consensual and more defensible from a scientific standpoint
than either unguided “bottom-up” approaches to regulation or
highly centralized and insulated “top-down” ones.112
109

See Cohen, supra note 71.
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Robin Gregory & Katharine Wellman, Bringing Stakeholder Values into
Environmental Policy Choices: A Community-Based Estuary Case Study, 39 Ecological Econ. 37, 38 (2001).
111

See Robin Gregory, Tim McDaniels & Daryl Fields, Decision Aiding,
Not Dispute Resolution: Creating Insights Through Structured Environmental Decisions, 20 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 415, 419–26 (2001); Robin Gregory &
Timothy McDaniels, Improving Environmental Decision Processes, in Nat’l Research Council, Decision Making for the Environment: Social and Behavioral Science Research Priorities 175, 187–91 (2005); Robin S. Gregory, Incorporating Value Trade-Offs into Community-Based Environmental Risk Decisions, 11
Envtl. Values 461, 472–84 (2002); Robin Gregory & Lee Failing, Using Decision
Analysis to Encourage Sound Deliberation: Water Use Planning in British Columbia,
Canada, 21 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 492, 493–96 (2002); Robin Gregory, Joseph Arvai & Tim McDaniels, Value-Focused Thinking for Environmental Risk
Consultations, 9 Soc. Probs. & Pub. Pol’y 249, 255–62 (2001).
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See, e.g., Gregory & Wellman, supra note 110, at 43–51 (describing
an experiment using structured, value-focused deliberation on the impact of development on a local estuary); Gregory, Arvai & McDaniels, supra note 111, at
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Structured, value-focused deliberation of this sort is likely to
engage all of the cultural cognition “debiasing” mechanisms we
have identified. Having been candidly exposed to the values of
their fellow citizens, participating individuals are likely to form a
more realistic and less antagonistic picture of how positions are distributed among their neighbors. Armed with expert information
and assisted by mediators, they are likely to engage in more sophisticated appraisals of the costs and benefits of the regulatory options
available. And because the matter is being resolved not by remote
agencies or administrators, but by them in a context in which experts engage them face-to-face, participants are likely to form trustinducing emotional bonds that free them from the need to rely entirely on cultural affinities in assessing the credibility of information
sources.
Indeed, the generation of culture-independent forms of trust,
particularly between lay persons and risk experts, is likely the most
valuable feature of genuinely democratic policymaking. The design
and implementation of policies for managing toxic waste disposal,
nuclear power generation, and other societal risks inevitably demands substantial reliance on remote expert regulators. Because
members of the public know that their fate is in the experts’ hands,
as it were, risk experts can count on enduring political support for
their decisions only if members of the public trust them. And one
of the most important conditions of such trust, research shows, is
the perception that officials have consulted and are responsive to
affected members of the public.113
The relationship between trust and deliberation ought to make
even those who share Sunstein’s confidence in experts wary of
granting them the political insulation he and other irrationalweigher theorists advocate. Just as consultation breeds trust in expert risk regulators, so too the perception that such officials are remote and unaccountable erodes it.114 Ironically, then, the greater
263–71 (describing an experiment involving deliberation over risks associated
with a hydroelectric power plant).
113

See Slovic, supra note 10, at 316–19, 322.
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See id. at 322–23, 409–10.
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the degree of political insulation the law affords to expert regulators, the less likely it is that popularly responsive institutions of
government will invest those regulators with power to begin with or
respect their decisions as final.
3. Culture and Expert Cost-Benefit Analysis. — We have suggested that Sunstein overstates the intractability of error in public
risk perceptions. But even if we are wrong, the cultural evaluator
model strongly critiques the antidemocratic nature of Sunstein’s
program. Bringing the role of cultural cognition into view severely
undermines the foundation for Sunstein’s refusal to afford normative significance to public risk evaluations generally.
As we have noted, Sunstein advocates delegating a sizeable
amount of discretion to politically insulated risk specialists. The
basis for this prescription is his normative assumption that the differences between lay assessments of risk and expert ones are the
product not of “rival rationalities” but simple errors on the part of
the public, generated by myriad social psychological pathologies (p.
86). Accordingly, even in a democracy, or at least in the best “deliberative” conception of one (p. 1), such public sensibilities are
entitled to no respect: “Democratic governments should respond to
people’s values, not to their blunders” (p. 126). Sunstein advocates
expert cost-benefit analysis as the principal device for making the
law responsive to the former (as reflected primarily in market and
other forms of private behavior) and not the latter.
The cultural evaluator model suggests that this strategy borders on incoherence. In the public consciousness, there is no genuine distinction between the “costs” and “benefits” of putatively
dangerous activities. Adopting the stance that best expresses their
cultural values, citizens invariably conclude that activities that affirm their preferred way of life are both beneficial and safe, and
those that denigrate their preferred way of life are both worthless
and dangerous.115 Moreover, unlike attitudes that reflect overgen115

See supra text at notes 54; see also Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations
of Consumers, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1700, 1740–41 (2003) (noting difficulty posed
to risk utility analysis by inverse relationship between costs and benefits in public
risk perceptions). Although we focus here on the challenge cultural cognition
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eralization, disregard for small probabilities, inattention to base
rates, and similar manifestations of bounded rationality,116 risk perceptions originating in cultural evaluation are not ones individuals
are likely to disown once their errors are revealed to them. Even if
individuals could be made to see that their cultural commitments
had induced them to attend in a biased fashion to factual information about the dangers of, say, nuclear power, guns, or abortion,
they would likely view those same commitments as justifying their
policy preferences regardless of the facts.117
As a result, the idea that expert cost-benefit analysis respects
citizens’ “values” but not their “blunders” is fundamentally misleading. When expert regulators reject as irrational public assessments
of the risks associated with putatively dangerous activities —
whether nuclear power or handguns, drug use or toxic waste dumping — they are in fact overriding public values. For just as citizens’
perceptions of the benefits of these activities express their worldviews, so do their perceptions of the risks they pose.
As Douglas and Wildavsky argue, public risk disputes, however much they are dominated by technical analyses of empirical
data, are in essence “the product of an ongoing political debate
about the ideal society.”118 Experts might have a more accurate
sense of the magnitude of various risks (although their conclusions,
too, are hardly immune from cultural partisanship),119 but they
have no special competence to identify what vision of society —

presents to cost-benefit analysis, we note that others have suggested additional
telling criticisms. See, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On
Knowing the Cost of Everything and the Value of Nothing (2004); Thomas
O. McGarity, Professor Sunstein’s Fuzzy Math, 90 Geo. L.J. 2341 (2002).
116

See Slovic, supra note 10, at 21–22, 35–39.

117 This is certainly true for firearms. See What Matters More? Consequences
or
Meanings,
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/index.php?option=content&task=vie
w&id=104.
118

Douglas & Wildavsky, supra note 33, at 36.

119

See supra text at notes 68–69.

Afraid of Democracy

47

hierarchist or egalitarian, individualist or solidarist — the law
should endorse. That should be a matter of public deliberation.
Or at least that is the conclusion likely to be reached by anyone who genuinely favors democratic deliberation. Sunstein
doesn’t. His is not a program for those who want to reconcile democracy with a rational response to public fears; it is a program for
those who fear democracy and seek to exclude the regulation of risk
from its ambit.
IV. Culture, Fear, and Liberalism
But the hard question for anyone who accepts the cultural
evaluator model as a descriptive matter is whether Sunstein’s fear
of democracy might indeed be warranted. The cultural evaluator
model, precisely because it exposes the clash of cultural visions that
inevitably animates public risk dispute, reveals the potentially deep
tension between democratically responsive risk regulation and liberalism.
The rational-weigher and irrational-weigher models disagree
about the competence of lay persons to assess the costs and benefits
of various risks. But both accept that the optimal balance is one
that maximizes satisfaction of individual preferences — or at least
(in the case of the irrational-weigher model) the preferences individuals would have were they accurately to perceive the costs and
benefits of putatively dangerous activities. This position flows naturally from the assumption that the purpose of risk regulation is to
induce an efficient level of safety. It also, conveniently, implements
a form of liberal neutrality by treating all persons’ valuation of
safety relative to other goals as entitled to equal weight.
But once the connection between risk perception and cultural
worldviews is exposed, the justification for this ecumenical stance
becomes less obvious. In selecting some risks for attention and dismissing others as unimportant, individuals are, effectively, advancing their culturally partisan visions of the ideal society. At least for
anyone who accepts the liberal injunction that the law steer clear
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of endorsing a moral or cultural orthodoxy,120 it is questionable
whether risk regulation policy should be responsive to such demands.
As a practical example, consider whether hospitals should
have an obligation under the “informed consent” doctrine to inform patients of the HIV-positive status of medical personnel. The
answer might be “of course” if we understand “informed consent”
doctrine as enabling individual patients to secure treatment consistent with their own medical welfare preferences.121 But the cultural
evaluator model suggests that the demand for such information
probably is not linked to “medical welfare” preferences in any
straightforward sense. Our own study suggests that hierarchists, but
not egalitarians, individualists, or solidarists, rate the risk of infection from an HIV-positive surgeon as a serious one.122 If what
makes hierarchists attend to this risk — while shrugging off many
more serious ones — is their preference to see the law reflect their
contested worldview, why should the law credit that preference at
the expense of those who hold competing worldviews that would be
denigrated by such a position, not to mention medical personnel
and other patients who would be adversely affected by it?
But risk regulation sensibilities animated by the hierarchical
worldview are hardly the only ones susceptible to these sorts of
concerns. For example, one might oppose the demand for stricter
forms of gun control on the ground that it derives not from an ac-

120 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there
is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion . . . .). See generally Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice
in the Liberal State 8 – 12 (1980) (arguing against invocation of partisan view
of the good to justify policy); John Rawls, Political Liberalism 212 (1993)
(same).
121 See Phillip L. McIntosh, When the Surgeon Has HIV: What to Tell Patients About the Risk of Transmission, 44 U. Kan. L. Rev. 315 (1996).
122 See
The
Cultural
Cognition
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/content/view/102/100/
Oct. 22, 2005).
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ceptable desire for personal safety,123 but from an illiberal desire to
erect an egalitarian or solidarist orthodoxy in law. At the same time
that it extinguishes one ground for interfering with market and political evaluations of risk — that lay sensibilities are irrational —
the cultural evaluator model arguably creates another: that those
sensibilities sometimes reflect an unjust desire to use the expressive
capital of the law to advance culturally imperialist ends.
Ironically, if one were convinced that illiberal cultural conflicts
of this sort were intractable, one solution might be Sunstein’s version of the irrational-weigher theory of risk perception. Normative
legal theories do more than justify particular doctrines and institutional arrangements. They also furnish vocabularies that determine
how citizens and legal decisionmakers talk to each other about
what the law should be; those vocabularies, by accentuating or obfuscating conflicts of value, can themselves influence how likely
such actors are to reach agreement, and how easily they’ll be able
to get along with each other if they don’t.124 In this respect, the
irrational-weigher theory’s analytical deficiencies can be seen as
conflict-abating, discourse virtues: precisely because the theory ignores the decisive role that cultural values play in shaping competing perceptions of risk, that theory mutes the function that risk
regulation plays in adjudicating between competing worldviews. So
defended, the irrational-weigher theory can be seen as implementing in the risk regulation field Sunstein’s preference for “incompletely theorized agreements,” his distinctive strategy for conforming the law to the liberal injunction to avoid endorsement of partisan visions of the good.125

123 Most citizens who support gun control, it turns out, say they would
favor it even if private possession of handguns reduced crime. See What Matters
More?
Consequences
or
Meanings,
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/index.php?option=content&task=vie
w&id=104.
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See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 35 –

Afraid of Democracy

50

Still, this is a defense of Sunstein’s program that demurs to,
rather than acquits it of, the charge that it is fundamentally antidemocratic. A genuinely democratic response to the liberal dilemma implicit in risk regulation might be possible too. Deliberation with a form of expressively pluralistic politics might make it
possible for citizens of diverse worldviews to agree on risk without
having to assent to law that denigrates anyone’s cultural identity.126
The prospects for such a program, particularly carried out in
the formation of national policymaking, are admittedly uncertain.
But we are certain that if there is a democratic solution to the liberal dilemma inherent in risk regulation, it can be formulated only
on the basis of the knowledge that the cultural evaluator model of
risk furnishes.
V. Conclusion
Laws of Fear is a masterful work. No book so comprehensively
and imaginatively synthesizes and extends existing empirical works
on risk perception. None more systematically develops these insights into a program for guiding risk regulation.
At the same time, Laws of Fear’s inattention to the impact of
cultural worldviews constrains both the descriptive and normative
power of Sunstein’s irrational-weigher model of risk perception. A
growing body of research demonstrates that conflicts in perceptions
of risk, not only between lay persons and experts but also among
the members of both groups, reflect individuals’ adherence to competing visions of how society should be organized. The culturalevaluator model account supported by this work furnishes a much
more complete account of why risk regulation is a matter of such
deep and intense conflict. It also undermines both the defense Sunstein offers for delegating significant risk-regulatory responsibilities

126 See Braman & Kahan, supra note 94, at 33–41 (defending an expressively pluralistic approach to resolving the American gun debate); see also supra
text at notes 94–113 (describing the use of deliberation to generate consensus in
favor of sound empirical information on risk).
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to politically insulated experts, and his claim that such a regime is
“deliberatively democratic.”
Ironically, though, the inattention of Sunstein’s account to
culture might itself be viewed by some as a strength. The cultural
evaluator model of risk perception ruthlessly exposes the inescapable role that risk regulation plays in adjudicating disputes between
competing cultural groups over whose worldview the law will proclaim orthodox. Sunstein’s irrational-weigher account strategically
obscures this function and thus offers one possible technique for
countering the inherently illiberal tendency of regulatory law.
The challenge that risk regulation poses to democracy is more
profound than it appears not only upon first inspection but upon
second inspection as well. The material well-being of a democratic
society depends on its ability to rationally manage a near limitless
variety of often competing risks. The integrity of such a society’s
commitment to self-governance depends on its ability to fashion
procedures that are genuinely deliberative, open, and democratic.
And its obligation to reconcile popular rule with respect for individual dignity and freedom requires it to find a mode of regulation
(and a strategy of regulatory discourse) that deflects the ambitions
of competing cultural groups to claim the law as theirs and theirs
alone.
No account that unqualifiedly celebrates the culturally expressive nature of risk perceptions and risk regulation can hope to
achieve all of these critical ends. But none that ignores the impact
of culture on risk perception can hope to achieve them either.

